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June 30, 1970 
POLITICAL WAUAU 
Explagatory Rote: 'l'he attached paper wa• prepared by a member 
of the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel, reflecting his concern as 
to thia neglected area of national defenae. 'l'he paper waa not 
submitted to or considered by the Panel. · 
Recommendation 
'1'hat the Preaident amint a •elect nog-
partiaa.n coaaiaaion composed of gualified yd 
diatingulahad Americana with authority to 
conduct an intensive atudy of the need for, 
and of the means to accompliah 1 an adequate 
political warfare atrateu for the United Statea. 
Brief Sumary 
Military atrength is only one el•ent of national power. 
In recognition of this• the major Communist states conduct exten-
sive political warfare against America and other free •ocietiea. 
This warfare includes the entlre spectrum of political, psycho• 
logical and propaganda operations. In level of intensity, 
•ubtlety and skill, there is no precedent in hiatory for the 
extent · and aµcceaa of ~Ji••• te,cm,iiqt1~• employed against us for 
I 
the past quarter of a century. 
'!be United Statea has largely abdicated these arenas 
of conflict ,to the Coamuniat powers. Die conaequencea of this 
default are profound, especially in t•rma of the impact on the 




millions of people in non-Collawniat countries, including thia 
country, have· accepted Coullluniat propaganda in varying degreea. 
Much of it ia parroted daily throughout the free world in the 
CAaaJnicationa media, on the campus, in literature, by the arta 
and theater, and on the puplic pl•tform. 
Huch of the world bu coma to believe the 11•• that 
it ia America - not the Coe-mist superpowers• which ia repreaaive, 
militaristic and imperialistic. Much of the world no long•~ 
believes there ia a significant difference between totalitari.id.am 
and a free democracy, . !he cre~ibility of our policiu at home 
and abroad baa been impaired. 
In abort, America is loaing the ideological contest -
not on ita merits but because wa have abdicated the field of 
political warfare to those who are c-1tted to the auppreaeion 
of freedom on this earth. 
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POLIT19M WAVA¥ 
It i• well to remember that mili~y atrengtb, vi.th 
the supporting economic and technological base, is only one 
element of national power. In defending America, we are not 
just protecting the real estate and nationalism of this country. 
We are defending our philoaophy and form of government againat 
the syetem of totalitarian repression which claeaic Coallluniet 
ideology require• ave~y state t.o impoee upon the world. ?be 
confrontation which has kept the world in turmoil for a quarter 
of a century 1• basically ideological. 
Political Warfare 
In thia conteat Aulerica has relied primarily on ita 
military and economic strength to restrain Communist aggrea-
siona and to preserve a meaaure of world ordu. We have 
scarcely made any effort to oppo•• the Coamuniat powers with 
the weapon• employed in the ideological arena. In contrast 
with thie default, the Soviet Union and Red Qlina have 
2. 
incessantly conducted political warfare against America and. 
other free societies. 'l'b.is warfare continues with no end in 
sight. It includes the entire spectrum of political, economic, 
psychological and propaganda operations (herein called 
"political warfare").* 
A thoughtful evaluation of the history of the poet• 
World war IJ. period indicates t.hat political operations may 
be aa importa~t to national defense as military forces; that ,~ 
political and ideological combat have been neglected over the 
past 25 years almost to the point of national negligence; and 
that, unless this neglect is repaired by appropriate and 
responsible action, in the long run other defense meaaurea may 
be futile. 
B.ecommendation 
In light of this judgment, it is recoananded: 
That the President appoint a select nonpartisan com• 
mis1ion cgmpoaed of _qualified and distinguished Americana with 
authority· to conduct an intenaive study of the need for, and 
of the means to accomplish, an adeguate political warfare 
•tratep for the United Stat••· 
*Subversion ia also• principal component of Coaauniat. operations 
against non•Coaaunist states·. 
3. 
The remainder of th~• paper Will discus•• in brief 
outline • · the background and reasons for this recoDBendation. 
The Protracted Conflict 
Since the end of World War II, world politics have 
been shaped by the bitter contest between the Communist super• 
power• and tbe free democracies led by the United Stat••• the 
Coamrunist states, unwilling to leave other systems alone, have 
sought to conquer by force where feasible and otherwise to under• 
mine and subvert free governments by all meana of political 
warfare. 'l'hia policy of overt and covert aggression has 
frustrated all efforts to assure a genuinely peaceful world, 
and baa forced tbe u.s. year after year to ex.pend billion• 
to maintain an adequate national defense. 
In recent .years the monolithic unity of the Communist 
nations has been fractured, with Red China emerging as the 
second Communist superpower competing £or leadership wit~ the 
soviet Union. Although many perennial <>ptimiata hailed this 
development as the end of the cold war and the beginning of 
a new era, there is li~tle hard evidence to support thi• •view. 
The truth is that the protracted conflict waged by 
the Communist powers against the free wo.rld continues, and 
only the naive can belieye there 1a any real prospect of its 
4. 
abat•ent. Protracted conflict against "imperialistic" and 
0 capitalistic0 societies ie a basic Marxist-Leninist dogma 
which all Communists support. It contemplates the utilization 
of all available resources. and techniques to extend Communist 
ideology and power tti.r:ougbout the world, and to weaken and 
eventually destroy American democracy•• .the only effective 
counterforce. 
AJ.1 cgmponents of Power 
Communist leaders have understood, far better than 
free world leaders, the interrelationship of the various com• 
ponent• of conflict and power. 1bey have not neglected con-
ventional military strength, recognizing alwaya the truth of 
Mao's app.oriam that power der1~4'~ from the "muzzle of a gun". 
But in the age of hydr_ogen . weapons, in which a third world 
war would leave no victor, the Communist superpowers for the 
mo•t part have avoided direct military conflict.* Instead 
they have concentrated on less conventional methods of conflict, 
including the fementing and aupport1ng of° "wars of liberation" 
and the conducting of subversion, propaganda, polit1c·a1, 
economic and psychological warfare. 
*Example• to the contrary include the Soviet Union's attacks 
on Hungary and Czechoslovakia, and Rad atina's conquest of 
Tibet and ita border incursions against Indi~. 
.5. 
our govarnaent, ••wall•• private canter• of Soviet 
atudi .. , have abundant dOCWNntation of the extant to which 
th••• conflict taobniquee have bean employed. Suffice it to 
eay bare tbat in level of intenaity, continuity, diversity, 
subtlety and skill, there ia no precadant in history for the 
extant and aucc••• of th••• techniques•• eaployed for the peat 
quarter ·of a century aga1nat the free world. 
'.Conf!9yencae of Aa9rioy R,fault 
During tbia .... ,period of tiae th• U.S. largel7 
abdiaated th••• ar--. of conflict to the •-1• there have 
bean a aver al af for ta, confined largely to infol'IIAtion pro.gr .... * 
' 
But we have not •aaaa•d in any auatained way in propaganda, 
political or paychological warfare agaioat either the Soviet 
vat• or bd Qlina.** 
'l'h• coaaaquencaa of thia default are profound -
.. ,-cially in taraa of the impact on the llinda and judgment• 
of citizens of the free world. 1'ba ' thruat of Coaauniat political 
warfare againat ~h• W.at baa been directed at a variety of 
••• Appendix A hereto .which awri.aea past U.S. effort• 1n 
certain aapacta of political warfare. · · 
*"'D:lia paper i8 addreaaad to th• atratagic, worldwide conflict 
wbioh baa continued aince the end of World war II. During tba 
Korean and South ViatnaMea wara our a~d forcea have engaged, 
to a 11aited extent and 1n a atrictly controlled aanaa, in 
"tactical" propaganda and pa7cbological var.far• in •upport_ of 
currant llilitary operations. 
6. 
targets, all interrelated. It bas aought to create doubt, 
division, distrust and disloyalty among the American people, 
and to undermine the faith and confidence of free peoplee 
everywhere in the values of natem. ~ulture. It also has 
sought, especially with respect to the peoples of undeveloped 
and uncoaaitted nations, to destroy confidence in the integrity, 
strength and will of the U.S. 
the U.S. is branded•• the enemy of "peace", u 
"imperialistic" and "militariatic" in its relations with other 
nations. the free enterprise system is attacked with special 
venom. American domestic policiea are labeled aa "faaciat", 
''racist", "represaive" and "exploitative". No opportunity 1a 
lost to embarrass and defame the U.S. 
1'b1a political warf4re ia massive in scale of effort 
and pervasive in scope. 
Each of the basic charges made against the U.S. ia 
actually a characteriatic of Q>ammiat foreign policy or a 
reality of Communist domestic policy. Bach of the wrongs for 
which America ia blamed ia in truth a nong perpetr•t•d - not 
episodically but deliberately u established Coallluniat policy -
by the Soviet Union, Red <Jlina and other Coanuniat atat••• 
the technique, quite simply, 1• the Hitlerian one 
'· 
of repetition of the big lie. 
7. 
One woul~ bav~ thought that the odda ware overwbelaingly 
against the Comcnunlata. the facts were al.moat totally againat 
th•• But the free .world leaders. who put their faith in the 
ultimate triumph of truth on ita own merit, grievously miacal• 
culated. Tena of millions of people in non•Cornaamiat countries, 
including milliona in this country, have .accepted Communist 
.prOpap.nda in varying degrees. Eleaenta of it are p~rroted 
daily in much of the COIIDIWlicatione udia, 011 the campua, in 
literature, by the arta 4Qd theater,. and on the public platform 
in this country and abrqad. 
lbe war in Sout~u•t Asia afforded a unique oppor• 
tun.it7 for Comrauniat ·exploitation. Legitlut• que•tiona ban 
exiated from the outaet •• to the wisdom of American participa• 
tion :l.n a land var in Aa:i.a. Moreover, a number of conaiclara• 
tiona • familiar to ua all - have coaa.bined to uk• thia wa1: 
vastly unpopular at home and abroad. But unpopularity of a 
national commitment ie one thing, and gq,•~•1 acceptance of 
the eneay propaganda line 'l,dtb reapect to such coaaitaent 1a 
a far aore serious matter. 
Whatever the reaaona may~. tbe lies _of Koacow, 
.: - v, 
Pieping and · Hanoi · with ;·respect to Aauar1can "aggruaion", 
"11Doralit7" and 0 brutality" in Soutbeaat Aa:La have been widely 
8. 
accepted as truth by much of the civilised world. Arnold J. 
Toynbee, internationally known British historian, recently 
published a savage article attacking America on all of th••• 
counta. He aaid: 
' 
*'America now looks like the moai danieroua , 
country in the world ••• . • 1n fact, the 
roles of America and Ruasia have bean reversed 
in the world'• •Y~• Today America baa become 
the world•• 'niptaare. • ., . •-. 
Th• Toynbeea, ancl the countleaa. others who join in 
denouncing America, rarely if ever find any fault with the 
COIIIIJniat eneaiee of freedoe. In the frightening mlndleaan••• 
of thia age• when alogana are ao often aubatituted for thought• 
the repreaaiona of a regime which requires a Berlin Wall are 
largely ignored and its aggressions against othera are even 
justified. Yet the free•t and moat c011paaaioute society ia 
pilloried and ita efforts to protect the free world are 
conderaaed. 
1bia incredibly false inversion of the facta of history 
atteata to the extraordinary aucceaa ,of Conw1niat political 
warfare. 
It also accenta the folly of our failure to mount 
or auataia an effective refutation of the propaganda and lies 
•see Reaton, N.Y. Tim.ea, May 27 1 1970, 
directed against us. and to take the offensive in waging 
political and ideological warfare against Russia, Red China 
and North Vietnam. 
9. 
The cumulative results of this "no-contest" policy 
extend far beyond Southeast Asia. There are deep miegivings 
around the world about America. Millions of our people hav 
turned against their~ country to the extent of blaming 
rica - rather than the Communists - for th• level of inter• 
national discord. 
Our f oreign and defense policies have been clouded, 
especially in the minds of the yo':11\ger generations. Our 
ilitary eatablishment 1a widely su$pected and asaailed, and 
our intelligence services reviled at home and abroad. Even 
on vital measures for the cormnon defense of our country, th 
President and the Congress are seriouely inhibited from taking 
appropriate action. Most disquieting of all, our national 
unity is fractionalized. 
It 1s not too much to say that the entire, foreign 
policy and influence of America have been impaired by the 
roaion of support at home and the undermining of confidence 
abroad. 
Revulsion to the Vietn~se war no doubt bas co~tri• 
buted significantly to the present situation. It is possible 
10 .. 
that the war 1.taalf. without regard to, our failure to contest 
Coulm.tn1st world-wide propaganda. psychological warfare and 
subver:sion, would have caused some of the present anti• 
Americanism abroad and lack. of support at home .. 
But we would again miscalcul.•te .. perhaps irreparably • 
:lf we assumed that an end to tbe war would restore perspective 
and understanding of truth. The startling success of the Com• 
mwtist ideologiMl assault on .America and tbe values of the 
free . democracies was clearly evident before our involve1Uent ln 
Vietua:m, If this assault remains unchallenged it will in time: 
destroy the free world's confidence in democracy as oppo.eed to 
I 
Coaaunism, and thi& eould mark the end of western civilization. 
9!r: CQuntrz:'• MiacQngelved Reluctance 
Future historian• will wonder·why Am.erica, with its 
immense communcations capabilities and with truth on ita side, 
pursued this policy of self•impoaed restraint in the critical 
war of words and ideas. The reasons given are varied, but the 
one moat frequently voiced 1s that the American people consider 
political warfare to be unethical and immoral. Like espionage• 
it has been considered a dirty business to which we should n~t 
stoop. 
11. 
1here also baa been the strongly held view that our 
actions would apeak for thamaelvea if objectively reported and 
portrayed. We thua have relied on the United States lnforu.• 
tion Agency which provides news, books and other factual 
information about America. Although the "objectivity" of ~SIA 
has at times ae.,..d to lean over backward, there is no thought 
of diacontinuing or changing the character of tbia useful 
American world-wide news aervice. 
Bather, . the need is for an effort of an entirely 
different character and dillenaion. The need u for a defenae 
effort in political warfare comparable in. acale to that conducted 
by the Soviet Union and lad Q\ina against the United States, 
through propaganda, political and psychological meaaurea. 
It ia important here to note that political warfare, 
in the aenae conducted against tbia country, is far more than a 
public relations program. It 1DUat baa sustained ~d coordinated 
effort - by all effective muns - to discredit Coamuniam •• 
a eyet- and the foreign and domestic policies of the Coallluniat 
parties in the Soviet Union and Red ai1na. In aimpieat terms, 
we are talking about conducting against these Coallluniat regJ.M• 
the type of political warfare which they have conducted against 
this country so mercilessly, except that full diacloaure of 
• 
12. 
the truth about Communism would be employ~d to confront their 
"big lie" technique. 
We muat put aside the self deception that the 
techniques of political warfare are unethical or iaaoral. 
'l'he fact ia that on the domeatic scene ve employ many of these 
techniques again•~ each other with con•iderable savagery. 
Example• include the political "warfare" constantly wa1ed 
between Democrat• and Republicana, betwtaen the Kew ~ft and 
the Eatablialuaent. and - at a different level• between labor 
and business. Even within the free enterprise competitive 
system., legitimat• advertiaing regularly include• el•enta of 
propaganda and psychological motivation. No country baa bad 
greater experience in the creating and de1troying of images, 
of likes and dislikes,. in the generating of ci.vilian attitudes, 
and in the winning and influencing of public opinion. 
Why ia it that we practice these skills with· such 
relentleasn••• on each other and yet have been unwilling to 
employ th• againat an •n•y which threatena our very survival? 
Is it any l••• ethical for the U.S. to respond in 
kind to the political warfare of the Comaauni.ata than for the 
Democratic National Colllll1ttee to t~y to discredit the a.publican 
Party (and vice ver•al? 
~ I. • 
13. 
OUr Reptraint Bas lfgt Worked 
It will be said that the undertaking of political 
warfllre b7 the U.S. will exace~bate relations with Communist 
countries, will beat up the "cold••~"• and will inhibit 
disarmament negotiations. 
In eseence, these are the eame arguments which have 
been ude for tvo decades. They are prami••d on the assumptions• 
d4nD.Onatrated by history to be falae - that Communist regime• 
' 
are infl\lenced by good example, by reatraint, or by "turning 
' ' ; ' . 
the other cbeek0 • 
' { 
The total .rience ·of
1
dealing with Communiat regime• 
indicates that .they are ne,_,.r_influenc;ed -by friendliness, 
gestures of goodwill, foreign trade, or by concesaiona -~ 
unilaterally without obtaining an equivalent consideration. 
Aa waa true of Bitlarian Germany, conduct of tbia kind is 
regarded aa. evidence of weakness to be exploited. 
In undertaking political operatlona it should be u.de 
clear that they are subject to 11negotiationau. juet as we are 
willing to negotiate ax:ms limitations. In other worda• we 
ahould undertake political warfare operations, as a ujor 
eleaent of national defense, on essentially the same scale as 
thoae employed against us. we should do nol more, and certainly 
we should do no less. 
14. 
We bave tried for 37 years (aince recognition of tha 
u.s.s.a. in 1933) to bring the soviet Union into the orbit of 
natioo.a which conduct no~l diplomatic relations without 
anployment of propaganda• political aod p•yc:hological warfare 
techDiquea. flier• baa bean no suetainad ruponae to thia good 
example. It it not time that we abandoned a policy wbich bu 
failed so conapicuously, and confront the Coa11niat superpower• 
with the same type of operationa which they persistently ..,107 
againat ua? 
'Iba Rt9isive Advant•g• 
Our reluctance to include tbitl component in defense 
of omr values and country ia all the more 1>"1.ldering in view 
of the opportunitiea for aucc•••• 
lf the peoplu of the world understand the truth about 
Cotaaunism, •~ contr••t•4 with the free democraci••• there would 
be no contest of ideologies. Colllaun1a• 1a u affront to the 
dignitJ of aan, and once experienced it l>ecomea anathema to 
aoat bUIUD beings. No people of any couati:y have ever voted 
for the o,,.,uniat ayat• •r• election• were free and they 
had a choice. Ro Coaauniat country baa ever permitted fr•• 
election, or even the expression of divergent views. 
.~.~. ----~-------------~-----~~------------------------------------~ 
15. 
America baa ita fault•• and no thoughtful person would 
minimize their aeriouaness or the intractability of many of our 
problems. But the issue ia not whether one ay•t• ie perfect 
and the other not. Rather, it ia which system provide• the 
greatest opportunitiea for mankind, for self fulfillment and 
for human liberty. Here indeed there should be no doubt •• to 
the answer. 
The single best evidence of this, defpita 25 years 
of Coamruniat propaganda, 1• that ervery Coaauniat country ua 
to restrain ita own people from leaving by wall• and barbed 
wu:ea. Ho free democracy requires such barbaric reatraint to 
keep ita own people from fleeing. 
America therefore baa the JaOat inviting opportunity 
to c9nduct dramatically successful ideoiogical operationa qainat 
the Communist pow~i•· ' Moreov•~• aucb operation• are ••••nti~lly 
, ' 
low coat when compared with weapons ayatam.a and conventional 
d•fenae measures. Int~• end, 'the m~st b\D&lle type of conflict 
t. to conteat for mip.~•- of people rather than rely entirely on 
' 
means to kill thaa. 
Diatinction_Betw••n Internal and Bxterul Qperatioe, 
'lb.ere 1a, regrettably, conaiderable evidence of the 
effectiv~•• here in ~rica of Soviet propaganda, aubveraion 
,, ,.,:--_ . ' . 
16. 
and political warfare. Jut it 1• not augaeated that the federal 
goVft'DINQt undertake any oounter prc,pagar.a operationa on tbe 
bolle front. Whatever tile riak. of Comnliniat auoceaa -Y be 
internally, we do not want a federal ad.niati-y of propaganda, 
We -..t rely on the reaponaible political leader• of both partlea 
to devote a greater effort to inforad.rig the public a• to Oalll• 
IIUDiat activitiea. We muat also rely on the private aector, 
ud .. ,-otally upoo our educational inatitud.oaa, to aaauaie 
with greater biatorical perception the neglected rupouibility 
of teaching tbe truth about the contrut between our ayat• of 
fi-eNOll under law and~ j~••* 
'l'be conclucting of political defuae operationa inter-
nationally ia a different matter. If tb .. e -1"e undeJ:taken, 
there ahould be a federal agency in charge. ibether it allould 
be within the Departaent of Defenae or a aeparat~ agency 1• a 
aubject to be atudied. 
Whatever the agency aay be, it •~uld be organiaed, 
ataffed and financed aa a penument part of our national dafwe 
atructure, with .. tabliahacl ••na of coor~ting tbe efforts of 
all aganciu .of gov•maent which have irater:national r .. ponaib111ti• 
i&re 1a relatively little intentional pro-ca ~aiat tuchiq 
in th1a country . .. !here ia, however, a curious boatility aong 
intellectual• to · "anti Ca 111m:latlt teaching. h•• ibly u aa 
over•reaotion to ''Macarthyi.1111"; 1118DJ lucle~• · of intellectual 
opinion in the U.S. ue aore diapoaad to react advenely to 
''anti•COllllunl••" tball t~· ••eo · ,ntn". 
• 41 ~, " 
~ 
Perhaps firat of all there ia the urgent need for 
~ipartiaan recognition of tbe fact that in the late 20th 
17. 
Century conventional armament• alone are not aufficient; that 
the Ccaauniat superpower•• through continued aployment of 
the- total ar•enal of political conflict, can create a fatal 
pafalysi• of public aupport and will_; and that the only effective 
way to counter auch warfare ia to employ appropriate po11t1cal 
measure• aga1nat tboae who eeek to destroy freedom .. 
Lewi.a r. Powell• .Jr. 

,. 
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E?4?lanatory Hate : The attached paper was prepared by a member 
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Recommendation 
That the President appoint a select non• 
partisan commission composed or oualified and 
dis tin;·,uished An.ericans with authority t~ 
conduct an intensive study of tne need for , 
and of the means to accomolish~ an adeouate 
political warfare strategz for the.United Stat~s . 
/. j : ... 
- .B~~ef Surmnary -~ ..... ,.,. 
!li.litory strength is only one al31:ll2nt of national power. 
In recognition of this• the major Communist states conduct exten• 
sive political warfare against America and other free societies. 
This warfare includes the entire spectrum of political, psycho• 
logieal and propaganda operations . In level of intensity• 
subtlety and skill, there is no precedent in history for the 
extent and success of these techniques employed against us for 
the past quarter of a century. 
The United States has largely abdicated these arenaa 
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2. 
millions of people in non-Communist countries. including thi 
I 
country, have accepted Communist propaganda in varying degrees . 
' I 
Much of it is parroted daily throughout the free world in the 
I 
communications media, on the campus, in literature, by the arts 
'lor'•., 
and theater, and on the public platform. 
. ' 
Much of the world has come to believe the lies that 
it is America - not the Communist superpowers - which is repressive, 
militaristic and imperialistic. Much of the world no longer 
believes there is a significant difference between totalitarianism 
and a free democracy. The credibility of our policies at home 
--~ ~~-~a~ ~ft~~~~~ ~~o~~4d Q.UU. a,a.,..._._, W. Utiil.CII -,....,_,,_.., .,...,....,.~...,...,.._.._, 
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· not on its merits but because we have abdicated the field of 
political warfare to those who are committed to the suppression 
of freedom on this earth . 
, 
... : ...... . ' 
·{•:.; ~"' ,, :~/_,;\: 
;"'I. ... • .4 J - ~ 
• .. :• I" -
...... 
... . t, ~ :,. ~ ··:· 
_";• .. J',1 •c~ -: • _, ,#0 ,. -~ 
i 
! 





. ~•i ·'.' ; ,;? ''''.:, 
,.)~ ,' V ;~ ; ••:-., .-.---- ,. •.- •il .. -: 
·, 
I~ ; 
t•, ---.:.,.,.- .,. ,~., a,n• 
• 1:_1;(:;;. ;i- ~ r,.,, .,~ , ':, .. • -1,,.: 11'. 
it! ·i '; ~: ··. ,1 ·• .. ,~\ , · ,-: • 1·)t ... 
:"¾ •. o ~•I ~ /,i,f. ·, .. ;\-'.: ;; •A.1',IA: ,f'l ;;•-
~ f . · ,..,., ,,.. ,, .. ,, 
-, 
,. 




June 30, 1970 
POLITICAL WARFARE 
It is well to r emember that military strength, with 
the supporting economic and technological base. is only one 
element of national power. In defending America. we are not 
just protecting the real estate and nationalism of this country. 
We are defending our philosophy and form of government agains t 
•L- -••-•- -.C ,._,_,,.._, ..f .,.. __ z -- -------'- ,..._ •. ..L..f -L.. .-., ---.t.,. ,.----••-.f -• 
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ideology requires every state to impose upon the world. The 
confrontation which has kept the world in turmoil for a quarter 
of a century is basically ideological. 
Political Warfare 
In this contest America has relied primarily on its 
military and economic strength to restrain Communist aggres-
sions and to preserve a measure of world order. We have 
-scarcely made any effort to oppose the Communist powers with 
the weapons employed in the ideological arena. In contrast 
with this default, the Soviet Union and Red China have 





incessantly conducted political warfare against America and 
other free societies. This warfare continues with no end in 
sight. It includes the entire spectrum of political, economic, 
_...,_r ... - ,.t..-,-- -'--1 ---I ---- ---- -..J- _____ ..,., __ ,.... ~L.--.-4--. --11.....,....1 
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"political warfare").* 
A thoughtful evaluation of the history of the post• 
World War II period indicates that political operations may 
be as important to national defense as military forces; that 
political and ideological combat h.ave been neglected over the 
past 25 years almost to the point of national negligence; and 
that, unless this neglect is repaired by appropriate and 
respons ible action, in the long run other defense measures may 
be futile. 
Recommendation 
In light of this judgment, it is recommended: 
That the Pres ident appoint a select nonpartisan com-
mission composed of qualified and distinguished Americans with 
authority to conduct an intensive study of the need for 1 and 
of the means to accomplish 1 an adequate political warfare 
strateszv for the United States. 
*Subversion is also a principal component of Communist operations 
against non-Communist states. 





The remainder of this paper will discuss - in brief 
outline - the background and reasons for this recommendation. 
I 
I 
The Protracted Confl i ct 
Since the end of World War II, world politics have 
been sha ped by the bitter contest between the Communist super-
powers and the free democracies led by the United States. The 
Communist states, unwilling to leave othe~ systems alone, have 
sought to conquer by force where f easible and otherwise to under-
mine and subvert free governments by all means of political 
wa:i:f ai:e- This policy 0£ overt and covert aggression has 
frustrat ed all eiforts to assure a. genuinely peaceful world, 
and has forced the U.S. year after year to expend billions 
to maintain an adequate national defense·. 
In recent years the monolithic unity of the Communist 
nations has been fractured, with Red China emerging as the 
second Communist superpower competing for leadership with the 
Soviet Union . Although many perennial optimists hailed this 
development as the end of the cold war and the beginning of 
a new era, there is little bard evidence to support this view. 
The truth is that the protracted conflict waged by 
the Communist powers against the free world continues, and 
only the naive can believe there is any real prospect of its 
. ,'/' . 





abatem.e~t. Protracted conflict against "imperialistic" and 
ucapitalistic 0 societies is a basic Marxist-Leninist dogma\ 
which all Communists support. It contemplates the utilization 
of all available resources and techniques to extend Communist 
ideology and power throughout the world, and to weaken and 
eventually destroy American democracy as the only effective 
counterforce. 
All Components of Power 
Communist leaders have understood, far better than 
44ee world laade4s, ~he interrelacionship of che variou& com-
ponents of conrlict and power. They have not neglected con• 
ventional military strength, recognizing always the truth of 
· Mao's apporism that power derive~ from the ''muzzle of a gun". 
But in the age of hydrogen weapons, in which a third world 
war would leave no victor, the Communist superpowers for the 
most part have avoided direct military conflict.* Instead 
they have concentrated on less conventional methods of conflict, 
including the fermenting and supporting of "wars of liberation" 
·and the conducting of subversion, propaganda, political, 
economic and psychological warfare. 
*Examples to the contrary include the Soviet Union's attacks 
on Hungary and Czechoslovakia~ and Red China's conquest of 
Tibet and its border incursions against India. 
.. ./" 





Our government, as well as private centers of Soviet 
studies, have abundant documentation of the extent to which 
these conflict techniques have been employed. Suffice it to 
\ 
say here that in level of intensity, continuity, d~verslty, 
subtlety and skill, there is no precedent in history for the 
extent and success of these techniques as employed for the past 
quarter of a century against the free world. 
,consequences of American Default 
During this same period of time the U.S. l argely 
Abdicated these arenaa of conflict to the enemv. There have -·- - . -· 
been several efforts, confined largely to information programs .* 
But we have not engaged in any sustained way in propaganda, 
political or psychological warfare against either the Soviet 
Union or Red China.H 
The consequences of this default are profound -
especially in terms of the impact on the minds and judgments 
of citizens of the free world. The thrust of Communist political 
warfare against the west has been directed at a variety of 
*See Appendix A hereto which sunnnarizes past U.S. efforts in 
certain aspects of political warfare • 
tiThis paper is addressed to the strategic, worldwide conflict 
which has continued since the end of World War II. During the 
Korean and South Vietnamese wars our armed forces have engaged, 
• - .. • • .. " - .. 1: • .... • • • ....._ .. - - ,. ___ - .... ·• 'f - - · - -- - _, ...-
~o a. .Ll.ID1.1;eu exi;;eni; a.nu 1.n a 1n • .c-:a.c1...1.y cun1..t:v.1..1.t:u ~t:111:n:1, .&.u 
"tactical" propaganda and psychological warfare in support of 
current military operations. 





targets, all interrelated. It has sought to create doubt, 
division, distrus t and disloyalty among the American people, 
and to undermine the faith and confidence of free peoples 
everywhere in the values of western culture. It also has 
sought, especially with respect to the peoples of undeveloped 
and uncommitted nations, to destroy confidence in the integrity, 
strength and will of the U.S. 
The U.S. is branded as the enemy of "peace", as 
"imperialistic" and ''militaristic" in its relations with other 
nations. 
. ...,,. ..... ,..... 
"Y '- 4 A....,.t.!4. it 
The free enterprise system is attacked with special 
.f..:e~i~.:::~ dC!"~et!~ p!'li~!~~ ~!'~ l~Q~_led aa "fascist"~ 
''racist", "repressiveu and nexploitative 0 • No opportunity is 
lost to embarrass and defame the U.S. 
This political warfai;e is massive in scale of effort 
and pervasive in scope. 
Each of the basic charges made against the U.S. is 
actually a characteristic of Communist foreign policy or a 
reality of Communist domestic policy. Each of the wrongs for 
which America is blamed is in truth a wrong perpetrated - not 
episodically but deliberately as established Communist policy -
by the Soviet Union, Red China and other Communist states. 
The technique, quite simply. is the Hitlerian one 







One would have thought that the odds were overwhelmingly 
against the Communists. 'lbe facts were almost totally against 
them. But the free world leaders, who put their faith in \the 
ultimate triumph of truth on its own merit, gr1evous1y m1scal• 
culated. Tens of millions of people in non-Communist countries, 
including millions in this country, have accepted Communist 
propaganda in varying degrees. ·Elements ·of it are parroted 
daily in much of the communications media, on the campus, in 
literature, by tha arts a.~d theater, and on t.~e public platform 
in this country and abroad. 
'!'ha i.r~r ht Southea~t: Asia afforded a un_ique oppor• 
tunity for Communist exploitation. Legitimate questions have 
existed from the outset as to the wisdom of American participa• 
tion in a land war 1n· Asia. ·Moreover, a number of considera-
tions• familiar to us all - have combined to make this war 
vastly unpopular at home and abroad. But unpopularity of a 
national commitment is one thing, and general acceptance of 
the enemy propaganda. line with respect to such commitment is 
a far more serious matter. 
Whatever the reasons may be, the lies of Moscow, 
Pieping and Hanoi with respect to American "aggression", 
"immorality" and "brutality" in Southeast Asia have been widely 





accepted as truth by much of the· civilized world. Arnold J. 
Toynbee, internationally known British historian, recently 
published a savage article attacking America on all of these 
counts. He said: 
"America now looks like the most dangerous 
country in the world ••• . • In fact, the 
roles of America and Russia have been reversed 
in the world's eye. Today America has become 
the world's nightmare •••• "* 
The Toynbees, and the countless others who join in 
denouncing America, rarely if ever find any fa.ult with the 
Communist enemies of freedom. In the frightening mindlessness 
.,.._.g: t-h.f o an-A - ~~h.,. ... a 1.,..,....,. ... ., ,..,..,., "'"' ,.,,-,:.,.,,.,,.. ,.nhn.,.-1 .... 1-.,.,A -c=.,.,..,. .,.h,... ............ -
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the repressions of a regime .which requires a Berlin Wall are 
larg~ly ignored and its aggressions against others are even 
justified. Yet the freest and most compassionate society is 
pilloried and its efforts to protect the free world are 
condemned. 
This incredibly false inversion of the facts of history 
attests to the extraordinary success of Communist political 
warfare. 
It also accents the folly of our failure to mount 
or sustain an effective refutation of the propaganda and lies 








directed against us, and to take the offensive in waging 
I 
political and ideological warfare against Russia, Red China 
and North Vietnam. 
The cumulative results of this "no-contest" policy 
e~tend far beyond Southeast Asia. There are deep misgivings 
I 
around the world about America. Millions of our people have 
turned against their own country to the extent of blaming 
America - rather than the Communists - for the level of inter-
national discord. 
Our f0rreign and defense policies have been clouded, 
aanA~iallv in the mindA of the voun2er 2enerations. Our 
- - ... - - •-- - - - 4 - ~ - ~ - -
military establishment is widely suspected and assailed, and 
ou~ intelligence services _ reviled at home and abroad. Even 
on vital measures for the common defense of our .country, the 
President and the Congress are seriously inhibited from taking 
appropriate action. Most disquieting of all, our national 
unity is fractionalized. 
It is not too much to say that the entire foreign 
policy and influence of America have been impaired by the 
erosion of support at home and the· undermining of confidence 
a.broad. 
Revulsion to the Vietnamese war no doubt bas contri-
outed significantly to the present situation. .. - , ~ - - ~ , 1 _ • -J.1; J..8 pu1uu.u.1.t: 





that the war itself, without regard to our failure to contest 
Connnunist world-wide propaganda, psychological warfare and 
. I 
subversion, would have caused some of the present anti-
Americanism abroad and lack of support at home. 
But we would again miscalculate• perhaps irreparably• 
if we assumed that an end to the war would restore perspective 
and understanding of truth. The startling success of the Com• 
munist ideological assault on America and the values of the 
free democracies was clearly evident before our involvement in 
Vietnam. If this assault remains unchallenged it will in time 
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Communism,· and this could mark the end of western civilization. 
~ 
Our Countrz's Misconceived Reluctance 
Future historians will wonder why America, with its 
immense communcations capabilities and with truth on its side, 
pursued this policy of self-imposed restraint in the critical 
war of words and ideas. The reasons given are varied, but the 
one most frequently voiced is that the American people consider 
political warfare to be unethical and immoral. Like espionage, 







'lbere also has been the strongly held view that our 
actions would speak for themselves if objectively reported and 
I 
portrayed. We thus have relied on the United States lnforma-
t:ion Agency whi.r.h p,:nui ~ou "!.:.':·'~, ~':'~~!! ~~~ ~~~::)t' =.::.:::t:~! 
information about America. Although the "objectivity" of USIA 
has at times seemed to lean over backward, there is no tho~ght 
of discontinuing or changing the character of this useful 
American world-wide news service. 
Rather, the need is for an effort of an entirely 
different character and dimension. The need is for a defense 
effort in political warfare comparable in scale to that conch.icted 
by the Soviet Union .and Red China against the United States. 
through propaganda, political and psychological measures. 
. . 
It is important here to note that political warfare, 
in the sense conducted against this country, is far more than a 
public relations program. It must be a sustained and coordinated 
effort - by all effective means - to discredit Communism as 
a system and the foreign and domestic policies of the Communist 
parties in the Soviet Union and Red China. In simplest terms, 
we are talking about conducting against these Communist regimes 
the type of political warfare which they have conducted against 







the truth about Communism would be employed to confront their 
"big lie" technique. 
We must put aside the self deception that the 
techniques of political warfare are unethical or immoral. 
The fact is that on the domestic scene we employ many of these 
techniques against each other with considerable savagery. 
Examples include the political "warfare." constantly waged 
between Democrats and Republicans, between the New Left and 
the Establishment, and - at a different level• betwaan labor 
and business. Even within the free enterprise competitive 
--,-.•- , .... ,.., .. ., ............ ariua..-f-.fridna ,.Aan1.ai-1U' -fnrlnd~g elAmAnt'.R of 
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propaganda and psychological motivation. No country has had 
greater experience .in the creating and destroying of images, 
of likes and dislikes, in the generating of civilian ·attitudes, 
and in the winning and influencing of public opinion. 
Why is it that we practice these skills with such 
relentlessness on each other and yet have been unwilling to 
employ them against an enemy which threatens our very survival? 
Is it any less ethical for the U.S. to respond in 
. 
kind to the political warfare of the Communists than for the 
Democratic National Committee to try to discredit the Republic~n 





our Restraint Has Not Worked 
I 
It will be said that the undertaking of political 
I 
13. 
warfa~e by the U.S. will exacerbate relations with Communist 
countries, will heat up the "cold war", and will inhibit 
disarmament negotiations. 
In essence, these are the same arguments which have 
been made for two decades. They are premised on the assumptions• 
demonstrated by history to be false - that Communist regimes 
are influenced by good example, by restraint, or by "turning 
the other cheek". 
The total experience of dealing with Communist ·reg1mes 
indicates that they are never influenced by friendliness, 
gestures of goodwill, foreign trade, or by concessions made 
unilaterally without obtaining an equivalent consideration. 
As was true of Hitlerian Germany, conduct of this kind is 
regarded as evidence of weakness to be exploited. 
In undertaking political operations it should be made 
clear that they are subject to "negotiations 0 t just as we are 
willing to negotiate arms limitations. In other words, we 
should undertake political warfare operations, as a major 
element of national defense, on essentially the same scale as 
those employed against us . We should do not more, and certainly 






We have tried for 37 years (since recognition of the 
u.s.s.R. in 1933) to bring the Soviet Union into the orbi~ of 
I 
nations which conduct normal diplomatic relations without '. 
employment of propaganda, political and psycho1ogica1 war4are 
techniques. · There has been no sustained response to this good 
example. Is it not time that we abandoned a policy which has 
failed so conspicuously, and confront the Communist superpowers 
with the same type of operations _which they persistently employ 
against ua? 
The Dacioivs Adv~ntaga 
our reluctance to include this component in defense 
\ 
of our values and country is all the more bewildering in view 
of the opportunities for success • . 
If the peoples of the world understand the truth about 
Communism, as contrasted with the free democracies, there would 
be no contest of ideologies. Communism is an affront to the 
dignity of man, and once experienced it becomes anathema to 
most human beings. No people of any country have ever voted 
for the Communist system where elections were free and they 
had a choice. No Communist country has ever permitted free 





America has its faults, and no thoughtful person would 
I 
minimize their seriousness or the intractability of many of our 
problems. But the issue is not whether one system is perfect 
and the other not. Rather, it is which system provides the 
\ 
greatest opportunities for mankind, for self fulfillment and 
for human liberty. Here indeed there should be no doubt as to 
the answer. / 
The single best evidence of this, de~pite 25 years 
of Communist propaganda, is that every Communist country has 
to restrain its own people from leaving by walls and barbed 
wile: ii • ,._,._ L!.--- ..2 ______ ,...,. ... ~,.••' ..-,.Gd nu~-~- ~3LU.v~•a~, •~~~~~~~ ~~ch ha~be~!~ r~~traint to 
keep its own people from fleeing. 
.,.,/ America therefore has the most inviting opportunity 
to conduct dramatically successful ideological operations against 
the Communist powers. Moreover, such operations are essentially 
low cost when compared with weapons systems and conventional 
defense measures. In the end, the most humane type of conflict 
is to contest for minds of people rather than rely entirely on 
means to kill them. 
,!listinction Between Internal and External 9Eerations 
There is, regrettably, considerable evidence of the 






and political warfare. But it is not suggested fhat the federal 
government undertake any counter propaganda operations on the 
home front. Whatever the risk of Communist success may be 
I 
internally, we do not want a federal ministry of propaganda. 
we must rely on the responsible political leaders of both parties 
to devote a greater effort to informing the public as to Com• 
munist activities. we must also rely on the private sector, 
and especially upon our educational institutions, to assume 
with greater historical perception the neglected responsibility 
of teaching the truth about the contrast between our system of 
f?"e~d.om t!??tle?." 1~ ~~d l".nmmnni lllffl. * 
The conducting of political defense operations inter• 
nationally is a different matter. If these are undertaken, 
there should be a federal agency in charge. Whether it should 
be within the Department of Defense or a separate agency is a 
subject to be studied. 
Whatever the agency may be, it should be organized , 
staffed and financed as a permanent part of our national defense 
structure , with established means of coordinating the efforts of 
all agencies of government which have international responsibilitie 
*There i.s- relatively little intentional pro-Communist teaching 
in this country. There is, however, a curious hostility among 
intellectuals to "anti-Communist" teaching. Possibly as an 
over-reaction to "McCarthyism", many leaders of intellectual 
opinion in the u.s. are more disposed to reacc adversely to 




Perhaps first of all there is 
bipartisan recognition of the fact that 
I 
the urgeft need for 
I 
in the late 20th 
17. 
Century conventional armaments alone are not sufficient; that 
the Communist superpowers, through continued employment of 
the total arsenal of political conflict, can create a fatal 
paralysis of public support and will; and that the only effective 
way to counter such warfare is to employ appropriate political 
measures against those who seek to destroy freedoin . 




















Summary of Pas t U. S . Government Activiti es 
Following Wor ld War II, th e Unit ed Sta t e s di ss olved 
I 
its ,;.;, a rtime appar a tus f or poli t ic a l communication even more rapidly 
I 
I 
than it demobiliz e d its arme d f or ces. On Augus t 31, 1945, on ly 
I 
=:; i )~ !: 2 2 :: d2~y= 2 f !:2:: !:~ ~ .!n p 2~ '2S C: ~·-! rr,:,:: dc:r 
1 
? :.e<.: ; rl P11 t- 'T'n,rn ::in -'lhril-
ished the Office of War Information. 
An interim program was developed a t a very low leve l of 
expenditure. But in J anuary 1947, the interim agency was granted 
permanent status as the Office of International Information and 
Cultural Affairs. William Benton was the first dir0ctor of this 
first venture of the United S_tates into peacetime internationa l 
political communication. Despite his energetic efforts, the 
,agency was unable to opcrate ·very eff ec tive l y , fac ed as it co!1-
[ stantly was with threats to its very_ existence in Congress. 
In 1948, the Smith·-Mundt Act was ·passed as the l:>asic 
·charter of the role of the government in developing international 
information and cultural exchange. The names of the new agency 
' were constantly changed and only meager appropriations were made. 
But beginning in 1950, the National Securi~y Council inaugurated 
a policy of more aggressive use - of propaganda and President Tru-
man announced a "Great Campaign of Truth". The "Campaign", under 
the leadership of Edwa rd W. Barrett, was designed to support 
,/ 
-I 
, ' ., 
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Amer i can l eadership and to reduce So vi et influenc e / in the inter-
na tiona l commun i ty, and to pre s en t Arner i c a fully a11cl f air ly as a 
counter t o Sovie t propaganda . 
I ~-!:. ".:~ t-'h O n ut.brPak of th e Ko r ean Wa r, a further stepp ed-up 
program was deve loped to answer the defama t i on and f alse charges 
- - - I 
which were by t hen a constant s tre am f r om t h e Sovie t bl oc. Staff s 
- I 
and budgets were s omewha t enlarged and t he effec t iven ess of th e 
I 
agency i mproved to me e t its expanded obliga tions. Unit ed Sta t es 
In f ormation Service (USIS) posts wer e mul t i pli ed around the wor l d , 
a corps of profession a l medi a experts began . to develop and expo-
sure for the ag ency's media produc ts reached n ew peaks . Es timP.f-!=•~ 
a r e tha c the USIS f i l m audicr.c e , fo ~ exampJe ] tripl ed during . thi s 
period to a rate of 400 million persons a year. 
The se expansion years were marked by a change of emphasi s 
' in the agen cy's program. Aware that accurate portraits of Ameri-
can standards of living often induced envy or despair among poorer 
peoples, and convinced _that persuasion, rather than information 
alone, was the agency's mission, the agency heads placed greater 
emphasis on a program of hard-hi~ ting propaganda. 
With increased success and visibility, the agency contin~ed 
a political issue in Congress and in the pr esidentia l c ampaign of 
-r 
1952. Several Congressional invesigations occurred, some respon-
1\ 
~- '"-"!""• , ...... - - • i 
sible and some less so. 'TI1e most exh aus tive of th 0.m , ,J.:1 s by a 
- _ subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Re lations Committee , headed 
first by Senator Fulbright and th en by Senator Hickenlooper. Con-
gress was obvious ly skeptica l of the value and effectiveness of 
an expanded foreign information program . Severa l members sug-
gested tqa t propagan da ought to go beyond the "campa i gn of truth 11 
to comment and argument of a more positive n ature. Other criti-
cism was directe d at the lack of inter -depar t mental coopera tion 
and the failure to assure effective operation of the information 
agency through giving it sufficient prestige as an indep endent 
_.:, r,, (:\,-, ,, ,, 
Ub'--'-'-J 2::-:d ~...1 p ,..,,,.r'\-f- e 1"<T 'Ct'-!.-'-:1. U C!. '- -LJ trained personnel. 
As a· result .of these and other investigations, the agency 
- was again reorganized in 1953, by a presidential reorganization 
plan, submitted to Congress. The plan created the United States 
Information Agency (USIA) as an independent organization~ while 
the overseas apparatus retained its wartime identity as USIS. 
(The educational exchange program was left in the Department of 
State.) The Agency, while receiving its foreign policy guidance 
from the State Department, was fully responsible for its own in-
formation policy. 
USIA was to report to the President through the National 
-· - -
Security Council. Gradually the Director became a voting member 
-
--· 
of t he Operations Coordinating Board an<l finally was accorded 
- _ full Cabine t status in 1956 . A succession of r e latively ,;-.,1cll-
known directors of US IA followed through the 1950 1 s and early 
1960' s. 
In the late 1950 1 s, long-range education projects took 
their place a long with more conventional information activities. 
The "People-to -People 11 project, involving contacts among private 
citizens of na tions was develope d and coordinated by USIA. 
But the emphas i s , espec ially after the misunderstandings 
apparently caused -by some Hungarian-language broadcasts during 
' · - " · ........ • .. •. !_ --·- --~ ~ • - ---. ...... ~ ;J ... . ... -~ ~ .,__t_ _ d ..... ,. .. ,... f 11 .... • ~,..... -f-h l""'., ,-.h;-n rr . cne .tiUilga.r.Lall U !J LJ..;::,l l1~;::, a.ilu U.U.L.1-n.s .... u.2 o.y-,J 0.1-.1-0 1\7 lc,6 ... ~ C. ._, ,1)1,_, , _ .. .. b 
of sp12tr:.ik, ·was incrPasin.:: ly upon c'l etc1ched and accurate news 
- reporting, with the hope of reinforcing the credi bility of USIA, 
and of the United States. 
USIA, under Ed,;,;,ard R. Murrow, in the early 1960 's, · 
achieved an influence in foreign policy foimulation that can 
I Jbe ascribed to the prestige of the Director himself. Budgets 
/ grew to $170 million by the time cancer forced Murrow to resign. 
/ Although preoccupation with events in southeast Asia divert ed 
I resources and attention from USIA, it has continued to be an 
I 
I 
important component in the foreign policy of the United States. 
/ It does not purport, however, to engage in propaganda or political 
I ----~C--- ~---~4-~ ..... ~~ 
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The Chief instrument of USIA, and the best-known, i s 
r adio, particular ly the Voice of America (including RIAS [radio 




is supplemented by s everal private ly owned r a dio stations : 1the 
Wor ld,;-1ide Broadcast i ng System , operat ing for over a quarter 1of 
a century from Bos ton, the Committee of Free Asia , Inc., s ending 
.... 
programs to Asia from San Francisco and Mani la, Radio Libera -
tion, ope rating from Munich, and Radio Free Europe . 
The l at ter c1gency , -non-governmental in nature, is per-
mitted greater flexibi lity· and freedom, including fre,edom from 
Congress iona l i nterference ·. It was sta:: ted in 1949 unde r the 
initi~tive of George Kennan , J-0 ,..., .. -.i-.. ,, r .. d..., ' " " ,.; r;- .~ Sc1..11 J. v. ure .1 an u..:....\°~1 .,L,1.,..l,... V• Pr", 1 '--' L'-"'-'-1--, 
't-iit:h the c0llaboratio0 of Dean Acheson. The organization embarked 
on a number of ambitious enterprises, including the Free University 
-
jn Exile, set up at Strasbourg, France, later discontinued. It 
is supported by funds from various sources through an independent 
= agency, Crusade for Freedom . Other media efforts, as well as the 
j vast education, library and exchange progr ams, are coordinated 
/ from Washington but directed largely from the USIS field offices. 
/· The effectiveness of these services is attested to by their broad 
I pqpularity and by the violence with ·which the Communists often 
I 
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APPENDIX 
Summary of Past U. S. Government Activiti(~S 
Following World War II , th e United States dissolved 
its wartime apparatus for political communication even more rapidly 
t h an i t demobilized its a rme d fo rces . On August 31, 1945, only 
s i xteen days after t he Japanese surrender, President Truman abol-
i shed th e Offi ce of Wa r Informa t i on. 
An interim program was developed at a very l ow l evel of 
expenditure . But in J anuary 1947, the interim agency was granted 
permanent status a s t he Office of International I nforma tion and 
Cultural Affairs . Wi lliam Benton was the firs t director o f this 
first venture of the United States into peacetime in ternat i onal 
p o l i tie:al 12o ri-1.rt1un i c& tion . Despite his energetic efforts, th e 
-:,('rr.,,...,r,)y 't ,..,,...,C 11T""l "J h i CJ 'O r1r)µ-r-;=>I,:) \IAT•v,, 
, u b ..._. ...... \,.., •·-- - .. •- - ~ - - --r---- -- --.1 C\l"t""Ct,--.l"'i '-i,"::i I \.7 ..... . - ·- ..... - _, - • -· • .,I , 
- - -r~c~a es Jr c0n -
' stan tly wa s with threats to its very existence in Congress. 
In 1948, the Smith-Mundt Ac t was passed as the bas i c 
·charter of t h e ro le o f the government in developing international 
infor mation and cu l t ura l exchange. The names of the new agency 
were cons tan tly ch anged an d only meager appropriations were made. 
But beginning in 1950, th e Na tiona l Security Coun cil inaugurated 
a policy of more aggres s i ve use of propaganda and Presiden t Tru-
man announced a "Great Campa i gn o f Truth ". The "Campaign 11 , under 






American l eadership and to reduce Soviet influence in th e inter-
national co~munity, and to pres ent America fully an d fairl y as a 
c ounter to Soviet propaganda. 
With the outbreak of the Korean War, a further stepped-up 
p rogram was d e veloped to answer the defamation and false charges 
wh ich were by then a constant stream from the Soviet b l oc . Staffs 
and budgets were s omewhat enlarged and the effectiveness of the 
ag ency i mp r oved to meet its expanded obligations. Unit ed States 
Info rma tion Servic e ( USI S) posts were multip l ied aro und the wo r ld, 
a co r p s o f professional media e xperts began t o develop and expo-
sure fo r t he agen s y ; s media pr.oducL~ redched - -...-"f ....... "..,1,c-, .1. J. C: \ 'V 1-''-(...t, ,L 'r.U • Es tim.;::i t- Ps 
.!) 'Y' A I ii ;:l 1 -- -.....-r. r ~ -i . ---....l..! ....._ _ _....,,...,. rnP (i.""">LU .L.LL11l C.U\..!..!..\...-!..lL\_ · s ~~ ..... e::: ~~::;_"' le; 1-r i r> 1 P.d ciu r j ng this 
p eri od to a ra te of 400 mi llion persons a year. 
Thes e ex p ans ion y ears were marked by a change o f emphasis 
in the agenc y 's program . Aware that accurate portraits of Ameri-
can standard s of living o ften indu c ed envy o r despair among p oorer 
peoples, and convince d th a t persua s i on , ra th er than information 
alone, was th e agency's mission, th e agency h eads p l a c ed grea t er 
emphasis on a program of hard-hit t i n g p r opaganda . 
With incre a sed s u cces s an d v isibility, t he agency con t i nued 
a political i s sue in Congress and i n t he pr e s idential c ampaign o f 
~ 
1952. Several Cong r e ssional invesiga tions o c cur red, some res pon-
~ 
sib le an d s ome l es s so. 111e most exhau stive of them ·h1as by a 
s ubcommi ttee o f t h e Sena te For e i gn Rela t ion s Commit tee , h eaded 
fi rst by Senator Fulbright an d th en by Sen a tor Hicken looper . Con-
g ress wa s obvio usly skept i ca l o f the v alue and effectivene ss of 
an exp anded f o reign in f o rmatio n program. Severa l members sug -
ges t e d that propaganda ought t o go beyond t he "campaign of truth " 
to comment and argument of a more posi tive nature . Ot h e r c r iti-
cism was directed at the lack o f inter-depar t menta l coopera tion 
and the failure to assure effective opera t i on o f t h e informa tion 
ag ency through g iving i t sufficient presti ge a s an i ndependent 
.,,,.,.,..."',.." ,:i,-,rl .,:irlo r11 ,,qrp1v t: r a i n e d ner sonnel. "-"b'---'""-.1 ........... - ----i -·-- - - ✓ .... 
As a r e sult o f t h e s e and o ther inves t i gations ~ t he agency 
was again r e o rganiz e d i n 19 53, by a p res id ential reo rgan i z a tion 
· plan, submitted to Cong r e ss. The p lan crea ted the Unite d States 
Information Agency (USIA) as an in d epen dent organ izati on, whi le 
the overseas apparatus reta ined its wartime identity a s USIS. 
(The educationa l e x ch ange prog r am was l ef t in th e Dep ar tment of 
State.) The Agency, while rec eiving its foreign policy guidance 
from the State Department, was fully r es pon s ible f or its own in -
formation policy. 
USIA was to report to th e Pres i dent through the Na tiona l 




of t he Operat ions Coordina t i ng Board and fina lly wa s accorded 
full Cab ine t status in 1956 . A succes s i on of r e l ative ly well -
known directors of USI A fol l owe d t hrough the 1950 ' s a nd ea r ly 
1960 1 s . 
In the l a te 19 50 ' s , l ong- r ange education projec t s took 
the i r place along with more conventiona l i nformation activi t i es . 
The "People-to -People11 p r oject, involving contacts among private 
citiz ens of na tions was developed a nd coordinated by USIA. 
But the emphasis, especia lly after the misunderstandi ngs 
apparently caus ed -by some Hungarian- language broadcasts during 
\ 
the Hungaria n upr isings and during the days following the L:mnchi:::~ 
of spu tnik , ·was increasingly upon detached and accurate news 
reporting , with the hop e of reinforcing the credibility of USIA, 
and of the United States . . 
USIA, under Edward R. Murrow, in the early 1960's, 
achieved an influence in foreign policy formulation that can 
; be ascribed to the prestige of the Director himself. Budgets 
/ grew to $170 million by the time cancer forced Murrow to resign. 
I Although preoccupation with events in southeast Asia diverted 
I resources and at tention from USIA, it h:s continued to be an 
I 
/ important component in t he foreign policy of the United States . 
i 
! It does not purport, however, to engage in propaganda or political 
I . 





The Chief instrumen t of USIA , and the best-known, is 
radio, particularly the Voice of America (including RIAS [radio 
in the Amer ican sector ]). In addit ion , the raclio i:vork of USIA 
is supplemented by several privately owned radio stations: the 
Worldwide Broadcasting System, operating for over a quarter of 
a century from Boston, the Committee of Free Asia , Inc., sending 
.... 
programs to Asia from San Francisco and Manila, Radio Libera-
tion, operating from Munich, and Radio Free Europe . 
The latter agency, • n_on-governrnental in nature, is per-
mitted greater flex ibility · and freedom, including freedom from 
Congressional interference. It was stcrted in 1949 under the 
• • • • ..r: " -r 
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:·:i.th the ~0ll?J"rwe_t-i nn nf n P.A n A~hP-son. The or 2:anization embarked 
on a number of ambitious enterprises, including the Free University 
, 
in Exile, set up at Strasbourg, France, late r discontinued. It 
:is supported by funds from various sources through an i ndependent 
/ agency, Crusade for Freedom. Other media efforts, as well as the 
. 1 vast education, library and exchange programs, are coordinated 





The effectiveness of these services is attested to by their broad 
popularity and by the violence with which the Communists often 
make USIS facilities targets of mob action. 
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